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2Introduction and Statement of Purpose
In 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fractured, sparking ethnic division 
and war after being united for nearly fifty years under the iron fist of a powerful communist 
leader.  Nations vied for territorial control, and political leaders garnered support by appealing to 
ethnic self-determination.  Irredentism and brutal ethnic cleansing eradicated communities across
the Balkans.  Today, the former Yugoslavia exists as seven sovereign states.  The term 
"balkanization" now characterizes political fragmentation.
The breakup of Yugoslavia doesn't represent a common political trend, but rather an 
uncommon trend.  Many multiethnic states exist today and remain unified after hundreds of 
years.  Separatist or autonomist movements do spring up in these places, but these states manage 
to remain united.  How do these places satisfy the political ambitions of minority groups?  What 
mechanisms ensure the unity and stability of multiethnic states?  Under what conditions does 
popular support for separatism or autonomism thrive in deeply divided societies?
State borders on maps do not always correspond with how they exist in actuality.  
Regionalism and ethnonationalism complicate political and territorial dynamics within a state.  
In some cases, it appears that the federal arrangements of certain subnational territories within a 
larger state can threaten national stability.  Some states have attempted to ease ethnic tension by 
adopting power-sharing policies.  Consociationalism, in which political arrangements are 
designed to encourage inclusiveness and cooperation, has been touted as one approach to 
safeguarding stable democracy in multiethnic states.  Its effectiveness is not entirely clear, and 
the scholarship present varying reports of how it affects support for separatism and 
3ethnonationalism.  This study will compare the level of support for separatist movements in 
countries that have implemented consociational policies and in those that have not.
Literature Review
A General Overview of Consociationalism
Arend Lijphart, the leading scholar on consociational theory, suggests that "power 
sharing is a necessary...condition for democracy in deeply divided countries" ("Puzzle" 258).  He
argues that India, one of the most diverse countries in the world, most successfully quells 
regionalist sentiment during the periods in which it adopts more consociational policies that are 
inclusive of minorities in politics and protect minority rights (Lijphart, "Puzzle" 258).  A 
consociational state is broadly defined by the following features:
(1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic 
and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy for these groups, (3) proportionality 
in political representation and civil service appointments, and (4) a 
minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy (Lijphart, 
"Puzzle" 258).
Conversely, he states that under majoritarian systems of government, "stable democracy in 
deeply divided countries [is] highly unlikely" (Lijphart "Puzzle" 258).  If Lijphart is correct, then
consociational states should lack support for ethnonationalist and separatist groups.
According to Lijphart, one of the most significant factors necessary for successful 
consociational systems is "proportionality in political representation and civil service 
appointments" ("Puzzle" 258).  Consociational theory posits that "majoritarian methods have the 
tendency to overrepresent majorities" and to deny political space to minorities, thus fueling 
stratification and cleavages.  Florian Bieber agrees, and praises the Belgian "regulation of the 
4equal number of Flemish and Walloons in Government" and the consequent necessity to form 
coalitions (85).  
However, Bieber also observes that ethnic quotas in Bosnia have not been as 
constructive.  Bosnian political proportionality "places national identity over competence," as 
each region is only allowed to elect members of the dominant ethnic group (Bieber 85).  
Therefore, the three main parties in Bosnia are based primarily on ethnicity and are so dominant 
in their respective regions that there is not "a clear distinction between state and party structures"
(Bieber 86).  While this arrangement may be preferable to the violence of the 1990s, it may not 
bode well for the suppression of future ethnonationalism in the country and the effectiveness of 
quotas as a consociational solution.
Another key element of consociationalism is the promotion of cultural autonomy in order
to satisfy minority desires for political recognition.  Lijphart includes accommodations such as 
linguistic federalism and publicly-funded autonomous schools as a part of this (Lijphart 260).  
Bieber notes Belgian cultural autonomy's ability to decrease secessionist tendencies, to improve 
co-existence in multiethnic territories, and to "offer rights to groups in areas where it would be 
highly unlikely for them ever to be able to achieve territorial autonomy" (Bieber 91).  Subatra 
Mitra claims that the federal "three language formula" has been an important step for cultural 
autonomy in India (56). Hindi and English are enforced as the two national languages, but local 
languages are additionally given regional political recognition (Mitra 56).  The influence of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party has ensured the dominance of the Hindi language, but Mitra suggests that 
regional language recognition may satisfy regionalist sentiment (Mitra 58).  In this way, 
individuals maintain both national and sub-national identities, provided for by central-regional 
cooperation.
5Mitra's analysis is contradicted by Steven Ian Wilkinson's research into Indian language 
policy.  Wilkinson notes that when the state of Uttar Pradesh announced that Urdu would be 
introduced as a new official language, anti-Muslim riots resulted in 26 deaths and 200 injuries 
(789).  In Karnataka, the announcement of a new Urdu news program led to the death of 25 
people, and "caused the broadcast to be quickly withdrawn" (Wilkinson 790).  Wilkinson 
concludes that such measures may not always ease ethnic tensions, and may actually exacerbate 
them.
Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. and Robert J. Thompson introduce further evidence of the failures 
of cultural autonomy. They cite Canada's 1969 Official Language Act, which gave equal 
recognition to both English and French, or Belgium's division of "administrative facilities in 
sensitive areas" for Dutch and French speakers (Rudolph and Thompson 301).  According to 
them, neither of these policies stymied "ethnoterritorial sentiment" (and actually increased it for 
other ethnoterritorial groups), which they distinguish from ethnoterritorial parties (Rudolph and 
Thompson). 
Regarding electoral success, Rudolph and Thompson argue that consociational 
accommodations made by the center lead to the "declining political strength" of ethnoterritorial 
parties (300).  For example, they relate the Scottish National Party's "tacit support for the British 
Labour government between 1974 and 1979 in return for the latter's support for devolution" with 
the party's decline in electoral support in general elections and during the 1979 devolution 
referendum (Rudolph and Thompson 295, 301).  While this is most certainly true, the picture 
looks very different today.  Scotland now has a devolved Parliament, and the failure of Scotland's
2014 independence referendum did not negatively affect the SNP's general election performance;
they are now the third largest party in the House of Commons.  Though Bieber argued in 1999 
6that Belgian consociationalism was essential for cooperation between Flanders and Wallonia, 
Flemish separatists now constitute the largest party in the Belgian parliament.
Gordon E. Cannon's case study of Canada demonstrates that symmetric power-sharing 
may be less effective at quelling regional autonomist movements than asymmetric majoritarian 
systems.  After 1960, historically agrarian Quebec began to modernize and Canada became 
"semi-consociational" as the French-speaking elite negotiated with the dominant English-
speaking Canadian elite (Cannon 59-60).  By 1968, the Quebec elite split into "separatist and 
federalist factions," and in 1976 the separatist Parti Quebecois rose to power (Cannon 60-61).  
Prior to this, during the period from 1867 to 1960 in which "[Canadian] English 
subculture penetrated the [Canadian] French subculture through economic domination," the 
agrarian Quebecois remained "politically inert" and subordinate to the English-speakers (Cannon
57, 59).  Cannon claims that this period "closely resemble[d] the control model [emphasis 
added]" outlined by Ian Lustick, who argues that stability can be achieved in deeply divided 
states if one group dominates the other (Cannon 55, Lustick 330).  With tension surrounding the 
question of a "continued existence of a united polity," Cannon concludes that there was greater 
stability during this control period than during the following partially consociational arrangement
(61).
The only thing that is clear about consociationalism is that its effect on autonomist 
movements is not clear.  I believe that the relationship between consociational policies and 
electoral support for separatist and ethnonationalist parties is an area that requires more scrutiny.
Variables of Interest
7Let us now depart from a broad view of the literature on consociationalism and toward a 
pointed discussion of specific consociational variables.  In his seminal work, Patterns of 
Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Lijphart outlines ten 
characteristics that differentiate majoritarian democracies from consensus-based (consociational)
democracies.  For the purposes of this study, I examine three of these variables which are most 
pertinent to the electoral success of separatist parties: A) majoritarianism/pluralitarianism versus
proportional representation, B) unitary governments versus federal governments, and C) 
presidential systems versus parliamentary systems (Lijphart, "Patterns" 3).  In all three of the 
aforementioned dichotomies, the latter characteristics are representative of consociational 
arrangements.  I also examine the effect of societal cleavages, a non-governmental variable, in 
order to determine if the level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization contributes to separatist party 
formation and success.
Proportional Representation
Lijphart reminds us that majoritarian electoral systems with single-member districts "are 
likely to have two-party systems, one-party governments, and executives that are dominant in 
relation to their legislatures" (Lijphart, "Constitutional" 72-23). As such, we can logically expect 
that ethnic and regional parties will be much weaker or nonexistent in these systems due to a lack
of widespread appeal that is necessary in order to gain electoral viability.  On the other hand, 
"where ethnic minorities have formed ethnic political parties...PR has enabled them to gain 
virtually perfect proportional representation," such as in the cases of Belgium and Bosnia 
(Lijphart, "Constitutional" 77).  Again, following basic reasoning, if systems of proportional 
representation increase the viability of ethnic parties, then they likely also increase the viability 
of radical and separatist parties because of the reduced threshold for achieving electoral success.
8However, John D. Huber's research suggests that there is actually a negative relationship 
between proportional representation and the politicization of ethnicity.  His basic conclusion is 
that "voters have other interests or identities that are equally or more important" than ethnicity, 
and that because proportional representation makes it easier to form viable parties, "voters from 
the same group often divide their support across a number of parties" which may or may not be 
based on ethnicity (Huber 1000).  Huber cites the Catalans of Spain as an example, as a 2004 
survey revealed that Catalan voters split their support between two ethnic parties-- one of which 
supported Catalan independence and one of which opposed it-- as well as other non-ethnic 
parties (999).  Further, he makes the argument that "in majoritarian systems with geographically 
dispersed groups, there can be strong incentives for a minority group to vote together...in an 
effort to become pivotal in determining election outcomes," such as is the case with black voters' 
overwhelming support for the Democratic Party in the United States (Huber 999).  In essence, 
his research suggests the opposite of what is commonly assumed.  Majoritarian systems may 
increase the political salience of ethnic appeals, because minority groups feel pressured to vote 
as a singular bloc in order to be an effective political force.
Federalism
According to Lijphart, federal arrangements have the benefit of "giving autonomy to 
ethnic minorities" by creating decentralized provincial governments ("Patterns" 195).  In some 
consociational systems, subnational political units are created to coincide with social boundaries 
between minority groups, which "can make a plural society less plural by creating relatively 
homogeneous smaller areas" (Lijphart, "Patterns" 196).  Lijphart believes that federal policies 
9have benefited very pluralistic places such as India, a country with extreme linguistic diversity.  
As previously mentioned, India's federal system recognizes the many languages within its 
provinces, "making languages 'a cementing and integrating influence' instead of a 'force for 
division'," and ideally promoting harmony between the many groups (Kothari qtd. in Lijphart, 
"Patterns" 197).
Henry E. Hale suggests that this analysis may be too simplistic.  Hale asserts that the 
effect of ethnofederalism is more nuanced and its relation to interethnic conflict is dependent on 
how subnational units are divided.  His research focuses on "core ethnic regions" that contain 
"either an outright majority of the population or...at least 20 percent more of the whole country's 
population than...the second largest region," the presence of which contribute to the collapse of 
ethnofederal states (Hale 169).  The governments of these core ethnic regions can convince their 
constituents that "the core ethnic group can exist apart politically from other sections of the 
country" and therefore can "potentially organize a rival claim to sovereignty," pitting national 
and subnational units against one another (Hale 173, 175).  Consequently, in countries without 
core ethnic regions, it is more difficult for ethnonationalists to present a competing claim for the 
sovereignty over an ethnic group or a region.  With a greater number of smaller subnational 
governments, it naturally becomes more costly to create a nationalist movement that "weaves 
together many separate regional administrative structures" (Hale 178).  
Indeed, the data show that states with core ethnic regions may be more prone to 
instability.  Hale's study of twenty-eight ethnofederal states reveals that seven out of fourteen 
states that contained core ethnic regions collapsed (181).  None of the ethnofederal states without
core ethnic regions collapsed (Hale 181).  My study does not include core ethnic regions as an 
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input variable because it examines both federal and unitary states, but I do evaluate this concept 
in my analysis.
Parliamentary Government
On the whole, Lijphart endorses parliamentary executives as being better for power-
sharing in divided societies.  Because presidential systems invest executive power in a single 
individual, "[a] president almost inevitably belongs to one ethnic group" and the dominance of 
the president seems to preclude the inclusion of minorities in executive decision-making 
(Lijphart, "Constitutional" 81).  Parliamentary systems necessarily require "conciliation and 
compromise" when coalitions must be formed in order to form a government, and therefore it 
behooves members of parliament to strive for "the greatest possible inclusion of representatives 
of [minority] groups in the decision-making process" for the sake of having a stable and unified 
government (Lijphart, "Constitutional" 81).  Yet Lijphart notes that this is not always true, and 
cites Westminster-style systems with a "majority ethnic group" as an exception ("Constitutional" 
81).
In his criticism of parliamentary systems, R. Kent Weaver claims that because "party 
unity is required to keep the government in power from falling," regions that primarily support 
an opposition party "will be virtually shut out of government" (22).  It is simply the nature of 
parliamentary systems that a majority controls all decision-making, and that the opposition has 
no role in governance.  In Canada, the inability of Québécois legislators to articulate regional 
interests has created "increased pressure for the devolution of power" and has encouraged party 
leaders "to take a hostile stance toward the national government in order to prove their 
credentials as regional loyalists," because they cannot prove their credentials through 
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participation in the national government (Weaver 23).  The endorsement of full-blown separatism
by Quebec's regional party lends more credence to Weaver's criticism.  Weaver does clarify that 
there is one conditional element to this problem: countries with single-member districts are more 
likely to face this issue (22).
Societal Cleavages
Outside of state policies, Lijphart admits that one threat to the success of 
consociationalism is the lack of multiple cleavages within majority groups.  In India, Hindus 
constitute about 83% of the population, but are "so thoroughly divided by language, caste, and 
sect that they do not form a political majority," which allows for functional power-sharing 
arrangements (Lijphart, "Puzzle" 261).  Indeed, Bieber also acknowledges that internal divisions 
within Flemish and Walloons force coalition-making between the various identity groups (Bieber
85).  The Belgian party system contains three main parties at the highest level, but is structured 
along regional, linguistic, and religious lines; internal divisions and coalition-making mean than 
it is actually an eight-party system (Bieber 86).  Bosnian parties, on the other hand, are defined 
primarily by "national criteria," and thus ethnic groups are pitted against one another instead of 
working together (Bieber 86).  Thus far, it appears that significant internal cleavages do benefit 
the stability of deeply divided states by diluting potential majorities.
However, Steven Ian Wilkinson takes issue with this notion.  Wilkinson demonstrates that
since India has become increasingly consociational since the 1960s, incidents of "Hindu-Muslim 
riots, caste conflict, and separatist violence" have risen (771).  He claims that power-sharing 
incites action by "groups excluded from ethnic quotas...and from... groups who argue that they 
constitute a separate ethnic group that deserves its own benefits"; in essence, implementing 
consociationalism may encourage groups to exploit the system (Wilkinson 771).  Indian ethnic 
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leaders "[worry]...that members of their own group will vote along non-ethnic lines or for a party
that represents a competing ethnic identity...[and] frequently try to incite ethnic violence...to deal
with such defections and with rising political mobilization by subordinate members of their own 
group" (Wilkinson 788).  Even Lijphart acknowledges that too many groups can make political 
cooperation difficult, and admits that India "receives an unfavorable rating" due to this ("Puzzle" 
263).  Ultimately, it is not clear whether more cleavages increase or decrease ethnonational 
sentiment in deeply divided states.
Research Design
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not power-sharing significantly 
affects the strength of separatism in terms of electoral mobilization.  I compare 157 states, each 
of which has a combination of the variables of interest discussed in the previous section.  My 
research and analysis is based on Charles Ragin's qualitative Boolean method, which allows me 
to compare country-cases as configurations of dummy variables.  The advantage of this approach
is that it values "macrosocial units" and allows for "comparing wholes as configurations of parts"
(Ragin 5, 84).  In this study, the central goal is a comparison of different configurations of 
characteristics of various states.  These states exist as distinct groups, and it is insufficient to 
merely observe the variables cross-nationally without any regard for the distinction of states as 
macrosocial units.   
The four independent variables in this study are coded as either 0 or 1 based on their 
presence or absence within a given country-case.  Each variable will also be tied to letter, which 
will be shown as uppercase if the condition is present in the country-case, and lowercase if it is 
absent.  To reiterate, the independent variables include:
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1.  Proportional representation [A] (presence) versus majority/plurality/other [a] (absence)
2.  Federal [B] (presence) versus unitary [b] (absence)
3.  Parliamentary system [C] (presence) versus presidential/other system [c] (absence)
4.  Major social cleavages [D] (presence) versus minor social cleavages [d] (absence)
Variable (A) represents the presence of a system of proportional representation.  In states 
with proportional representation, electoral districts have a number of seats that are distributed to 
parties based on the percentage of the votes that they receive.  This is in contrast to majoritarian 
or pluralitarian electoral systems based on single-member districts, in which only the party or 
candidate that receives the most votes will represent that district.  There are variations on both of 
these methods, but these mixed electoral systems will also be categorized alongside majoritarian 
systems for the purposes of Boolean coding.  Information regarding electoral systems was 
gathered from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance website 
(www.idea.int).
Variable (B) represents the presence of a federal system of government.  Federalism is 
based on the principle of decentralizing powers from the national government to provincial 
governments.  The United States, which divides political power between the federal government 
and the fifty states, is the most notable example of federalism.  In unitary states, power is 
concentrated in the hands of the national government.  There may be local or regional 
governments in unitary systems, but they are ultimately subordinate and beholden to the center.  
The Forum of Federations website was used to determined which states are federal 
(www.forumfed.org).
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Variable (C) represents the presence of a parliamentary system of government.  In 
parliamentary systems of government, the Prime Minister is a member of the legislature and is 
selected to serve as the executive by other members of parliament.  In presidential systems, 
voters directly elect the President, who leads an executive branch which is separate from the 
legislature.  There are many other differences between the systems, but this is the primary 
distinction.  The classic example of a parliamentary system of  government is the United 
Kingdom, whose Westminster system has been replicated in many democratic states, and the 
United States' presidential system is the inspiration for most presidential systems around the 
world.  Alternative systems will be included alongside presidential systems for the purpose of 
Boolean coding.  Data on parliamentary and presidential systems of government was gathered 
from the McGill University website (www.cs.mcgill.ca).
Additionally, the non-policy variable (D) will represent the presence of major social 
cleavages.  This will be represented by a 1985 ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index from
UC San Diego professor Philip G. Roeder's website (http//:weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm).  
This scale represents how likely it would be for two randomly selected individuals in a certain 
country to be from the same ethnic and/or linguistic group.  Lower scores indicate less 
fractionalization, with "0" meaning total homogeneity.  Higher scores indicate more 
fractionalization, with "1" being the highest score. The purpose of including this is to determine 
if and how the number and sizes of ethnolinguistic groups affect support for separatism.  States 
without available ELF data are not included, as one cannot properly compare and analyze if 
some cases are missing entire variables.
For this study's Boolean analysis, scores of 0.5 or higher will represent the presence of 
significant fractionalization.  This may seem like an arbitrary cutoff, but any scientific study 
15
includes thresholds and cutoffs that could be considered arbitrary.  It is necessary to impose some
sort of limitations on an empirical study in order to be able to draw meaningful and concise 
conclusions.  Additionally, the distribution of ELF scores does not seem to be skewed towards 
either extreme, meaning that a cutoff of 0.5 serves as a solid median.
The dependent variable will measure electoral support for separatist movements.  
Separatist movements will be defined as ethnonationalist political parties that openly espouse the
immediate or eventual separation of a specific region or cultural group from the rest of the state.  
It does not include political parties that merely represent a particular cultural group or demand 
federalism or autonomy within a particular existing state.  Electoral support will be represented 
as the vote share of nationalist parties as a percentage in national legislative elections.  Only the 
percentages for the lower chamber election will be represented if the legislature is bicameral.  
These vote shares will cover the two most recent election cycles in each country.
Electoral data will be gathered from Adam Carr's Election Archive, the European 
Election Database, ElectionGuide.org (published by the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union's election database.  The past two election cycles 
have been documented for each of the 157 states.  Electoral data may be limited due to some 
parties potentially not being listed by the databases, or a lack of available information about 
listed parties.
Data Analysis
A B C D
Total
Instances
Instances of
Separatists
0 0 0 0 22 1
0 0 0 1 27 0
0 0 1 0 17 1
16
0 0 1 1 6 0
0 1 0 0 2 0
0 1 0 1 5 1
0 1 1 0 2 1
0 1 1 1 5 2
1 0 0 0 14 0
1 0 0 1 19 0
1 0 1 0 23 2
1 0 1 1 6 0
1 1 0 0 2 0
1 1 0 1 3 1
1 1 1 0 3 1
1 1 1 1 2 2
Above is the truth table which shows the distribution of cases based on their Boolean 
values.  Out of the 157 democratic or semi-democratic states that were evaluated, only twelve of 
them had visible separatist parties: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, and the United Kingdom.  A full 
dataset can be found at the end of this document.  It is very possible that there are other states 
with separatist political parties competing in national elections, but the sources that were 
consulted merely do not have enough information about some elections.  This is especially true 
for smaller and less developed countries.  It's not a particularly major concern, because separatist
parties that were missed by this study likely have very little support, and their lack of visibility 
does not hinder the empirical analysis.
Country
Primitive
Expression Election 1 Election 2
Belgium ABCD 23.93%(2014) 23.7%(2010)
Bosnia ABCD 14.32%(2014) 16.7%(2010)
Canada aBCD 4.7% (2015) 6.02%(2011)
Czech Rep. AbCD 0% (2013) 0.23%(2010)
France abcd 0.6%(2012) 0.52%(2007)
Germany aBCd 0.1%(2013) 0.1%(2009)
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India aBCD 0.07% (2014) 0.12%(2009)
Italy AbCd 0.44%(2013) 0.25%(2008)
S. Africa ABcD 0.93%(2014) 0.83%(2009)
Spain ABCd 6.93% (2015) 8.75%(2011)
Sudan aBcD 0% (2015) 22%1 (2010)
U.K. abCd 4.74%(2015) 1.9%(2010)
The primitive expressions can be represented as a Boolean equation, where (S) represents
the presence of electoral support for separatist parties:
S = abcd + abCd + aBcD + aBCd + aBCD + AbCd + ABcD + ABCd + ABCD
These primitive expressions can be further simplified in order to discover the most 
significant variable combinations.  If two primitive expressions with the same output have all but
one variable in common, the differing variable can be removed.  With this method I can 
minimize the expressions and find the prime implicants, which will aid my qualitative analysis.  
The minimized equation is presented below:
S = abd + BC + BD + Cd
According to this reduced equation, separatist electoral support results in four circumstances:
1) Majoritarian unitary states with minor social cleavages
2) Federal parliamentary states
3) Federal states with major social cleavages
4) Parliamentary states with minor social cleavages
Proportional representation does not appear to be strongly correlated with support for 
ethnonational separatist parties.   This lends credence to Huber's suggestion that majoritarian 
1 Sudan's percentage represents the percentage of seats in the legislature, not the percentage of votes cast for the 
separatist party.  Data about the latter is unavailable.
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systems may actually be more likely to spawn ethnonationalist parties, due to a pressure to vote 
as a unified bloc in order to be an effective political force under systems of majority and plurality
(999-1000).  The ability of proportional representation to allow a greater number of viable parties
may have a balancing effect.  Ethnonationalist parties can become viable in these systems, but so
can many other types of parties based on a wide variety of appeals.  Ethnonational identity is not 
inherently a stronger form of identity than others.  There are many potential affiliations that 
voters may prefer to associate with, including religion, social class, caste, environmentalism, and
others.
Federalism appears to be a significant contributor to separatist support in combination 
with parliamentary systems of government or in societies with significant social cleavages.  I 
will now refer back to Hale's argument that "core ethnic regions" in federal states contribute to 
interethnic conflict and collapse of ethnofederal states because they can challenge the center's 
claim to sovereignty over that territory.  To reiterate, a core ethnic region is a subnational 
province that contains "either an outright majority of the population or...at least 20 percent more 
of the whole country's population than...the second largest region" (Hale 169).  Of the eight 
federal states in which there was visible support for separatist parties, six of them have core 
ethnic regions: Belgium, Bosnia, Canada, Germany, India, and Sudan.  Only South Africa and 
Spain do not have core ethnic regions.  This is a very interesting discovery, and suggests that this
concept should be explored further in future research that concerns federalism and 
ethnonationalism.
Hale's analysis of ethnofederalism can be synthesized with Weaver's criticism of 
parliamentary systems for exacerbating regionalist sentiment and Wilkinson's warning that more 
social cleavages can produce increased ethnonationalism (Weaver 22-23, Wilkinson 788).  
19
Because opposition parties supported by certain regions have no participation in national politics,
the added imbalance created by the presence of a core ethnic region may further alienate 
minority groups.  The combination of a core ethnic region and major social cleavages could 
potentially create a perception in the minds of minority voters that they are the subjects of 
exploitation or are being treated as subordinate in comparison to the majority or plurality group.
The last variable combination (Cd) reiterates Weaver's criticism, but now also may 
confirm Lijphart and Bieber's argument that a greater number of social cleavages dilutes 
ethnonationalist appeals.  These scholars claim that, by offering alternative affiliations, increased
ethnolinguistic fractionalization hinders the consolidation of more monolithic ethnic groups as 
political actors (Lijphart, "Puzzle" 261, Bieber 85-86).  Therefore, one can imagine a situation in 
which regionalists become radicalized because they have been shut out of government, and the 
reduced number of social cleavages removes barriers that would otherwise hinder 
ethnonationalist groups from forming.
Absent Separatist Parties
There were also three primitive expressions from the table on page 15 that are strongly 
correlated with an absence of successful separatist parties.  I chose three Boolean codes for 
which there were over ten corresponding countries.  There are several other primitive 
expressions that also did not correspond to any of the countries displaying successful separatist 
parties in the past two election cycles, but I chose the following three because they all include a 
relatively high number of cases, which will make my empirical conclusions more robust.
s = abcD + Abcd + AbcD
20
The first primitive expression represents 27 cases, the second represents 14 cases, and the
last represents 19, for a combined total of 60 cases.  Below are the prime implicants derived from
this expression.
s = bcD + Abc
According to this reduced equation, a lack of separatist electoral support results from two 
circumstances:
1) Unitary presidential states with significant ethnolinguistic fractionalization
2) Unitary presidential states with proportional representation
The clear point of observation here is that unitary and presidential states are least likely to
produce separatist political parties.  Unit states may make it difficult to organize a regional 
movement, because the lack of provincial governmental autonomy discourages opinions that a 
region could become a viable independent state.  The legislative dynamics of a presidential 
system may also discourage separatist party formation because legislative members from a party 
outside of the government have a greater ability to participate in the political process compared 
to a parliamentary system in which the government has total control.  Additionally, the 
prominence of the executive in a presidential system may discourage some radical party 
formation, because ultimately only one candidate will win and therefore it behooves potential 
radical political actors to cooperate with moderates in order to elect the "lesser evil." Finally, the 
a unitary presidential state with major fractionalization that does not produce separatist support 
lends further credence to Bieber's argument that high fractionalization may reduce the viability 
of ethnonationalist movements due to a greater number of identity groups competing for loyalty.
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Conclusion and Limitations
It is important to remember that this study is solely concerned with separatist political 
parties.  I do not attempt to draw any conclusions about separatist organizations such as interest 
groups and militias.  Nor do I claim to make any definitive statements about separatist 
movements on the whole.
Separatist political parties, from what this study has demonstrated, appear only in very 
specific circumstances.  Eight of the twelve countries in which there was electoral support for 
separatist parties are European.  With the exceptions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa, 
and Sudan, all of the countries in which there was support for separatist parties are high-
functioning democracies.  Therefore, from the empirical findings of this study, I cannot draw any
global conclusions about the performance of separatist parties.  The level of development of 
political and electoral provisions, a condition not addressed by this study, likely can affect party 
formation to a significant degree.
Further, the inclusion of Bosnia and Sudan should be regarded with some caution.  I 
believe that removing them entirely from this study would potentially limit my analysis, but I 
also believe that it is my responsibility to inform the reader that both of these countries are 
peculiar cases. Their electoral results are heavily influenced by the end of major wars and the 
involvement of the international community.  Bosnia's electoral system was heavily influenced 
by outside forces after the signing of the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian War.  Similarly, 
the success of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in the 2010 elections preceded the 
independence of South Sudan in 2011.
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These two facts may warrant their exclusion in the opinion of some. I personally believe 
that their inclusion is appropriate, because this study simply does not analyze the influence of 
wars or the international community.  However, I would like to see a future study of separatist 
movements that does consider both of those factors as variables.
The findings suggest that some of the attributes of consociational systems are present in 
states where separatist parties find support, there is not strong evidence that consociationalism as
a whole is correlated with greater separatist electoral support.  In fact, there is evidence that the 
presence of majoritarian characteristics can just as easily contribute to separatist mobilization.  
The level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization also varies considerably when examining its effect 
on support for separatism.  In some cases high levels of fragmentation may aid separatist 
appeals, and in some cases it may hinder it.  I would caution against any hasty generalizations 
especially because visible separatist support was only present in a small number of cases 
compared to the sample size.
There are very likely additional reasons for a lack of separatist support in many countries 
that extend beyond the variables included in this study.  For example, some states may outlaw 
separatist parties may blatantly outlaw all separatist political parties.  This would represent a 
visible mechanism that stymies separatist support.  On the other hand, other states may not ban 
separatist parties outright, but may persecute members of these potential parties, or block their 
progress to becoming a legitimate party through bureaucratic means.  It is important that this 
study is not trying to determine all of the factors that contribute to the support or lack of support 
for separatism.  Instead, I merely hope to evaluate the degree to which political separatists are 
successful based on electoral and political structures.  
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Future studies may wish to include more variables, particularly some of the other ten 
consociational characteristics outlined by Lijphart.  An extended timeline that examines 
historical elections may also provide further insight.  I would also like to see a comparison 
between elections on the provincial level and elections on the national level to determine whether
the variables in this study have a more apparent impact at the regional level.
Most significantly, the effect of fractionalization on the formation of not only separatist 
parties, but ethnonationalist parties in general, needs much more research.  In this study I only 
considered one form of social cleavages, in the form of ethnicity and language.  Future studies 
should also examine the role of religion, class, and gender.  I would also encourage the creation 
of a suitable index that includes all five of these cleavages.
Finally, it might be worthwhile to change the focus from purely separatist political parties
(ie: groups that want a sovereign state) to those who want more power for their regions within 
the existing political system.  In the course of my research, I discovered many parties that were 
heavily nationalistic and desired more regional autonomy, but did not declare their desire for an 
independent state.  I do not think that this is would stray too far from the original design of this 
study, because as was seen during the breakup of Yugoslavia, the simple devolution of power can
contribute to the future success of secessionist militias and politicians.
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Afghanistan Other Unitary Presidential 0.67 0 0 0 1 abcD 0% (2010) 0% (2010)
Albania PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.06 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2013) 0% (2009)
Algeria PR Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.3 1 0 0 0 Abcd
0% (2012) 0% (2007)
Angola PR Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.78 1 0 0 1 AbcD
0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Argentina PR Federal Presidential 0.29 1 1 0 0 ABcd 0% (2015) 0% (2013)
Armenia Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.13 0 0 0 0 abcd 0% (2012) 0% (2007)
Australia
Plurality/Majorit
y Federal Parliamentary 0.44 0 1 1 0 aBCd
0% (2013) 0% (2010)
Austria PR Federal Parliamentary 0.15 1 1 1 0 ABCd 0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Azerbaijan
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.31 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Bahamas
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.41 0 0 1 0 abCd
0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Bahrain
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.5 0 0 1 1 abCD
0% (2014) 0% (2010)
Bangladesh Plurality/Majorit Unitary Parliamentary 0.04 0 0 1 0 abCd 0% (2014) 0% (2008)
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y
Barbados
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.08 0 0 1 0 abCd
0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Belarus
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.37 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Belgium* PR Federal Parliamentary 0.59 1 1 1 1 ABCD
23.93%(2014
)
23.7%(2010
Benin PR Unitary Presidential 0.53 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Bhutan
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.56 0 0 1 1 abCD
0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Bolivia Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.74 0 0 0 1 abcD 0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Bosnia and H.* PR Federal Parliamentary 0.7 1 1 1 1 ABCD
14.32%(2014
)
16.7%(2010
Botswana
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.4 0 0 1 0 abCd
0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Brazil PR Federal Presidential 0.58 1 1 0 1 ABcD 0% (2014) 0% (2010)
Bulgaria PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.23 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2014) 0% (2013)
Burkina Faso PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.71 1 0 1 1 AbCD 0% (2015) 0% (2012)
Burundi PR Unitary Presidential 0.31 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Cambodia PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.24 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Cameroon
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.88 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2013) 0% (2007)
Canada*
Plurality/Majorit
y Federal Parliamentary 0.77 0 1 1 1 aBCD
4.7% (2015) 6.02%(2011
Cape Verde PR Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.55 1 0 0 1 AbcD
0% (2011) 0% (2006)
Central African R.
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.83 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2011) 0% (2005)
Chad
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.86 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2011) 0% (2002)
Chile PR Unitary Presidential 0.52 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2013) 0% (2009)
Colombia PR Unitary Presidential 0.6 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2014) 0% (2010)
Comoros
Plurality/Majorit
y Federal Presidential 0.08 0 1 0 0 aBcd
0% (2015) 0% (2009)
Congo, DR Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.9 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2011) 0% (2006)
Costa Rica PR Unitary Presidential 0.46 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0%(2014) 0%(2010)
Croatia PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.42 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Cyprus PR Unitary Presidential 0.33 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2011) 0% (2006)
Czech Republic* PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.11 1 0 1 0 AbCd
0% (2013) 0.23%(2010
Côte d'Ivoire
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.9 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2011) 0% (2000)
Denmark PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.06 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2015) 0% (2011)
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Djibouti Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.71 0 0 0 1 abcD 0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Dominican 
Republic PR Unitary Presidential 0.48 1 0 0 0 Abcd
0% (2010) 0% (2006)
Ecuador PR Unitary Presidential 0.66 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2013) 0% (2009)
Egypt
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.03 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2015) 0% (2011)
El Salvador PR Unitary Presidential 0.16 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2015) 0% (2012)
Equatorial Guinea PR Unitary Presidential 0.47 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Estonia PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.53 1 0 1 1 AbCD 0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Ethiopia
Plurality/Majorit
y Federal Parliamentary 0.77 0 1 1 1 aBCD
0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Fiji PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.68 1 0 1 1 AbCD 0% (2014) 0% (2006)
Finland PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.13 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2015) 0% (2011)
France*
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.32 0 0 0 0 abcd
0.6%(2012) 0.52%(2007
Gabon
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.81 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2011) 0% (2006)
Gambia
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.72 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2012) 0% (2007)
Georgia Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.49 0 0 0 0 abcd 0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Germany* Mixed Federal Parliamentary 0.11 0 1 1 0 aBCd 0.1%(2013) 0.1%(2009)
Ghana
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.87 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Greece PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.09 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2015) 0%(2012)
Guatemala PR Unitary Presidential 0.76 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Guinea Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.75 0 0 0 1 abcD 0% (2013) 0% (2002)
Guinea-Bissau PR Unitary Presidential 0.78 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2014) 0% (2008)
Guyana PR Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.57 1 0 0 1 AbcD
0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Haiti
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.01 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Honduras PR Unitary Presidential 0.12 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2013) 0% (2009)
Hungary Mixed Unitary Parliamentary 0.01 0 0 1 0 abCd 0% (2014) 0% (2010)
Iceland PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.03 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2013) 0%(2009)
India*
Plurality/Majorit
y Federal Parliamentary 0.88 0 1 1 1 aBCD
0.07% (2014) 0.12%(2009
Indonesia PR Unitary Presidential 0.76 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Iran
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Theocracy 0.75 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2016) 0% (2012)
Iraq PR Federal Parliamentary 0.38 1 1 1 0 ABCd 0% (2014) 0% (2010)
Ireland PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.03 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2016) 0%(2011)
Israel PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.29 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2015) 0%(2013)
Italy* PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.11 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0.44%(2013) 0.25%(2008
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Jamaica
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.42 0 0 1 0 abCd
0%(2011) 0%(2007)
Japan Mixed Unitary Parliamentary 0.01 0 0 1 0 abCd 0%(2014) 0%(2012)
Jordan Mixed Unitary Parliamentary 0.46 0 0 1 0 abCd 0% (2013) 0% (2010)
Kazakhstan PR Unitary Presidential 0.69 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2012) 0% (2007)
Kenya
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.88 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2013) 0% (2007)
Korea, Republic of Mixed Unitary Presidential 0 0 0 0 0 abcd 0%(2012) 0%(2008)
Kuwait Other Unitary
Con. 
Monarchy 0.79 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2013) 0% (2012)
Kyrgyzstan PR Unitary Presidential 0.66 1 0 0 1 abcD 0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Latvia PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.61 1 0 1 1 AbCD 0% (2014) 0% (2011)
Lebanon
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.36 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2009) 0% (2005)
Lesotho Mixed Unitary Parliamentary 0.22 0 0 1 0 abCd 0% (2015) 0% (2012)
Liberia
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.9 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2014) 0% (2011)
Libya Mixed Unitary Transitional 0.27 0 0 0 0 abcd 0% (2014) 0% (2012)
Lithuania Mixed Unitary Parliamentary 0.35 0 0 1 0 abCd 0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Luxembourg PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.43 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2013) 0%(2009)
Macedonia PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.51 1 0 1 1 AbCD 0% (2014) 0% (2011)
Madagascar
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.87 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2013) 0% (2007)
Malawi
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.61 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Malaysia
Plurality/Majorit
y Federal Parliamentary 0.72 0 1 1 1 aBCD
0%(2013) 0%(2008)
Maldives
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Mali
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.83 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2013) 0% (2007)
Malta PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.07 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Mauritania
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.32 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2013) 0% (2006)
Mauritius
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.49 0 0 1 0 abCd
0%(2014) 0%(2010)
Mexico Mixed Federal Presidential 0.22 0 1 0 0 aBcd 0% (2012) 0% (2006)
Moldova PR Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.55 1 0 0 1 AbcD
0% (2014) 0% (2010)
Mongolia Mixed Unitary Parliamentary 0.35 0 0 1 0 abCd 0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Morocco PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.4 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2011) 0% (2007)
Mozambique PR Unitary Presidential 0.7 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Myanmar Plurality/Majorit Unitary Parliamentary 0.42 0 0 0 0 abcd 0% (2015) 0% (2010)
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Namibia PR Unitary Presidential 0.72 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Nepal Mixed Federal Parliamentary 0.66 0 1 1 1 aBCD 0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Netherlands PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.35 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2012) 0%(2010)
New Zealand Mixed Unitary Parliamentary 0.42 0 0 1 0 abCd 0%(2014) 0%(2011)
Nicaragua PR Unitary Presidential 0.39 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2011) 0% (2006)
Niger PR Unitary Presidential 0.68 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2016) 0% (2011)
Nigeria
Plurality/Majorit
y Federal Presidential 0.86 0 1 0 1 aBcD
0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Norway PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.06 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2013) 0%(2009)
Oman
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Monarchy 0.14 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Pakistan Mixed Federal
Semi-
presidential 0.54 0 1 0 1 aBcD
0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Panama PR Unitary Presidential 0.48 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Papua New 
Guinea
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.98 0 0 1 1 abCD
0% (2012) 0% (2007)
Paraguay PR Unitary Presidential 0.18 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Peru PR Unitary Presidential 0.51 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2011) 0% (2006)
Philippines Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.86 0 0 0 1 abcD 0% (2013) 0% (2010)
Poland PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.04 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Portugal PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.01 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2015) 0%(2011)
Republic of The 
Congo
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.68 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2012) 0% (2007)
Romania Mixed Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.21 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Russia PR Federal
Semi-
presidential 0.33 1 1 0 0 ABcd
0% (2011) 0% (2007)
Rwanda PR Unitary Presidential 0.26 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Samoa
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.04 0 0 1 0 abCd
0% (2016) 0% (2011)
Senegal Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.79 0 0 0 1 abcD 0% (2012) 0% (2007)
Sierra Leone
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.77 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2012) 0% (2007)
Singapore
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.4 0 0 1 0 abCd
0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Slovakia PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.24 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2016) 0% (2012)
Slovenia PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.18 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2014) 0% (2011)
Solomon Islands
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.95 0 0 1 1 abCD
0% (2014) 0% (2010)
South Africa* PR Federal
Semi-
presidential 0.89 1 1 0 1 ABcD
0.93% (2014) 0.83%(2009
Spain* PR Federal Parliamentary 0.46 1 1 1 0 ABCd
6.93% (2015) 8.75%(2011
31
Sri Lanka PR Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.42 1 0 0 0 Abcd
0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Sudan* Mixed Federal Presidential 0.73 0 1 0 1 aBcD
0% (2015) 22%*
(2010)
Suriname PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.73 1 0 1 1 AbCD 0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Swaziland
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Monarchy 0.27 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Sweden PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.14 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0%(2014) 0%(2010)
Switzerland PR Federal Directorial 0.59 1 1 0 1 ABcD 0%(2015) 0%(2011)
Taiwan Mixed Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.27 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Tajikistan Mixed Unitary Presidential 0.55 0 0 0 1 abcD 0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Tanzania
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.92 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Thailand In transition Unitary Parliamentary 0.63 0 0 1 1 abCD 0% (2011) 0% (2007)
Togo PR Unitary Presidential 0.71 1 0 0 1 AbcD 0% (2013) 0% (2007)
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.64 0 0 1 1 abCD
0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Tunisia PR Unitary Presidential 0.05 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0% (2014) 0% (2011)
Turkey PR Unitary Parliamentary 0.26 1 0 1 0 AbCd 0% (2015) 0% (2011)
Turkmenistan
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.46 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2013) 0% (2008)
Uganda
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.92 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2016) 0% (2011)
Ukraine Mixed Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.42 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2014) 0% (2012)
United Kingdom*
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Parliamentary 0.39 0 0 1 0 abCd
4.74%(2015) 1.9%(2010)
United States
Plurality/Majorit
y Federal Presidential 0.58 0 1 0 1 aBcD
0%(2014) 0%(2012)
Uruguay PR Unitary Presidential 0.38 1 0 0 0 Abcd 0%(2014) 0%(2009)
Uzbekistan
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.48 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2014) 0% (2009)
Vanuatu Other Unitary Parliamentary 0.34 0 0 1 0 abCd 0% (2012) 0% (2008)
Venezuela Mixed Federal Presidential 0.52 0 1 0 1 aBcD 0% (2015) 0% (2010)
Yemen
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary
Semi-
presidential 0.05 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2003) 0% (1997)
Zambia
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.81 0 0 0 1 abcD
0% (2011) 0% (2006)
Zimbabwe
Plurality/Majorit
y Unitary Presidential 0.47 0 0 0 0 abcd
0% (2013) 0% (2008)
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